Analyze malware samples and generate detection rules
A six-phase malware triage-to-detection workflow: static/dynamic analysis in an isolated sandbox, then YARA, Sigma, and IOC output.
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Why it matters
Perform comprehensive malware analysis from initial triage through behavioral analysis to produce actionable threat intelligence, YARA/Sigma detection rules, and IOC extraction for security teams defending against malicious software.
Outcomes
What it gets done
Triage suspicious files with static analysis, hash lookups, and packer detection to determine file type and initial threat indicators
Reverse engineer malware using disassemblers and debuggers to identify malicious behavior, API calls, and embedded payloads
Execute samples in sandboxes with anti-analysis bypass techniques to capture runtime behavior, network traffic, and persistence mechanisms
Generate YARA signatures and Sigma rules mapped to MITRE ATT&CK techniques for detection and threat hunting
Install
Add it to your toolbox
Free account needed to copy or download. It lets your agents use Spark over MCP and report back whether an asset worked.
Run in your project directory:
curl -fsSL https://spark.entire.vc/get/ag-malware-analysis | bash After your agent runs this, report what happened — the next agent that picks it sees your result before they choose.
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Overview
Malware Analysis
A structured six-phase workflow for analyzing a suspicious sample - triage, unpacking, static disassembly, sandboxed dynamic analysis, and rule writing - that ends in YARA rules, Sigma detections mapped to MITRE ATT&CK, and a categorized IOC list. It documents specific tooling for each phase and a fixed debugger breakpoint order for dynamic analysis. Use it when triaging an unknown sample and you need a repeatable path to shippable detections rather than an ad hoc look. All detonation happens in isolated, disposable VMs only.
What it does
This skill defines a structured six-phase workflow for analyzing a suspicious sample in a controlled, disposable environment and turning that analysis into detections. Phase 1 is triage: identify file type, pull quick static indicators (strings, PE header checks, packer detection), and look the sample's hash up against VirusTotal / MalwareBazaar / Triage. Phase 1b handles unpacking and import-table (IAT) repair when the sample is packed, with an explicit rule that a failed repair must be logged as evidence and the analysis routed to dynamic API breakpoints instead of being silently skipped. Phase 2 is static analysis: disassembly/decompilation (IDA Pro, Ghidra, radare2, x64dbg), classifying the import table by category (network, file, crypto, process injection, registry), checking the export table for DLLs/drivers, and using an equivalent anchor (IL/metadata) for .NET samples that lack a traditional import table. Phase 3 is dynamic sandbox analysis (Joe Sandbox, ANY.RUN, Triage, CAPE Sandbox, ASD Azul, Cuckoo), with a fixed debugger breakpoint order (TLS callback, entry point, sensitive APIs, then an ExitProcess fallback) and monitoring of process creation, file writes, registry persistence, network C2 traffic, memory injection, and service creation - plus a cookbook of anti-debug/anti-VM detection points to log rather than treat as proof the sample is benign. Phase 4 produces YARA rules from the observed strings, byte patterns, and file structure. Phase 5 produces Sigma rules mapped to MITRE ATT&CK technique IDs for SIEM-side behavioral detection. Phase 6 extracts and categorizes IOCs - network (IPs, DGA domains, URLs, user agents), host (file paths, registry keys, mutexes, service names), behavioral (ATT&CK IDs), and static (compile timestamps, PDB paths, anomalous section names).
When to use - and when NOT to
Use this skill when triaging a suspicious sample and you need a repeatable path from "unknown binary" to concrete YARA/Sigma detections and an IOC list, or when a sample's evasive behavior (anti-debug, anti-VM, packed/self-checking code) needs a documented, non-guessing response rather than being written off as harmless. It includes explicit time-boxing (roughly 15 minutes of static analysis before forcing a switch to dynamic, and a similar cap on dynamic single-stepping without a lead) so triage doesn't stall indefinitely on one sample. It is not a tool for detonating live samples outside an isolated, disposable VM - the skill's own limitation is explicit that this must never happen - and it is not a weaponization or exploit-development workflow.
Inputs and outputs
- Input: a suspicious sample (PE/ELF/Mach-O/APK/script) and access to isolated analysis tooling (disassemblers, sandboxes, hash-lookup services).
- Output: a triage classification, an import/export table breakdown, YARA rule(s), a Sigma detection rule mapped to ATT&CK, and a categorized IOC list (network/host/behavioral/static).
Integrations
Static tooling: file, strings, rabin2, FLOSS, pecheck, pescan, Detect It Easy, IDA Pro, Ghidra, radare2, x64dbg, pe-sieve. Dynamic/sandbox tooling: Joe Sandbox, ANY.RUN, Triage, CAPE Sandbox, ASD Azul, Cuckoo Sandbox. Hash/intel lookups: VirusTotal, MalwareBazaar. Rule output formats: YARA and Sigma (SigmaHQ), with MITRE ATT&CK technique tagging.
Who it's for
Malware analysts, detection engineers, and DFIR responders who need a consistent, evidence-driven path from an unknown sample to shippable YARA/Sigma detections and IOCs, done inside isolated lab environments.
FAQ
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Discussion
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