Reverse-engineer custom bytecode VMs in obfuscated JS
A six-phase methodology for reverse-engineering custom bytecode VMs embedded in obfuscated JavaScript, common in risk-control engines.
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Why it matters
Analyze and decode proprietary domain-specific language (DSL) virtual machines embedded in JavaScript-typically used by risk-control and CAPTCHA engines-to recover opcode semantics, extract constant tables, and trace execution flow for security research or automation.
Outcomes
What it gets done
Identify DSL VM fingerprints in obfuscated JavaScript files by detecting IIFE patterns, switch-case interpreter loops, and constant table references
Extract and classify opcodes from the VM's main interpreter loop, mapping instruction encodings to operation types like BRANCH, CALL, ARITH, and RETURN
Analyze constant tables (C[9]) to recover function indices, string literals, and parameter descriptors used by the bytecode
Inject runtime instrumentation via Selenium CDP or Playwright to capture token generation and trace exported function execution paths
Install
Add it to your toolbox
Free account needed to copy or download. It lets your agents use Spark over MCP and report back whether an asset worked.
Run in your project directory:
curl -fsSL https://spark.entire.vc/get/ag-dsl-vm-reverse | bash After your agent runs this, report what happened — the next agent that picks it sees your result before they choose.
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Overview
DSL 自定义虚拟机逆向(DSL VM Reverse Engineering)
A structured workflow for reverse-engineering a custom bytecode VM hidden inside obfuscated JavaScript - identifying the interpreter loop, extracting and classifying its opcodes, and mapping its constant table - rather than treating the file as ordinary JS or standard WASM. Use it when authorized security review of a web asset turns up a custom bytecode interpreter instead of standard WASM, and the goal is to understand its opcode semantics and constant table structure.
What it does
This skill provides a workflow for reverse-engineering a custom-bytecode virtual machine embedded inside obfuscated JavaScript - the pattern used by some risk-control and verification engines instead of a standard WASM binary. It starts with recognition: an IIFE entry point with single-letter variables mapped to numeric constants, an interpreter main loop (switch/case over an opcode decoded from a bitfield), a large single-line file with under 1% null bytes (ruling out real WASM), and a constant table indexed like C[9][x] holding function references and strings. It explicitly excludes standard WASM binaries (files starting with the \x00asm magic bytes, or with over 20% null-byte density) and ordinary bundled JS, routing those to other skills instead. The six-phase workflow moves from file classification, to extracting the variable-to-constant mapping table, to enumerating and classifying every opcode by what its case body does (branch, call, arithmetic, store, allocation, exception), to analyzing the constant table's reference range, to tracing an exported function back through its registration call to the bytecode sequence it executes, and finally - only when static analysis alone isn't sufficient - to runtime instrumentation that loads the code in a controlled browser context (via Selenium+CDP or Playwright) to observe what it computes. It documents a reference opcode-to-behavior table built from prior cases and a small set of common numeric status codes such an engine's output tends to use.
When to use - and when NOT to
Use it when a web asset under authorized security review runs a custom bytecode interpreter rather than standard WASM, and the objective is to recover what its opcodes mean and how its constant table is structured - for example while auditing a risk-control or verification component's own logic. Route to a different reference when the file starts with the WASM magic bytes (that's standard WASM, handled elsewhere), when it's an ordinary bundled JS file with no interpreter loop, or when the work is really about the surrounding network/API protocol rather than the VM's internal bytecode - that belongs to a separate JS reverse-engineering skill.
Capabilities
- File classification script that distinguishes a DSL-VM JS file from standard WASM or ordinary bundled JS using magic bytes, null-byte density, and IIFE variable patterns.
- Scripted extraction of the numeric constant-to-variable mapping, the full opcode
caselist, and a heuristic classification of each opcode (branch/call/arithmetic/store/allocation/exception) from its code body. - Constant-table reference analysis to map the range and context of indices used by the interpreter.
- A documented, prior-case-derived reference table of 26 opcode numbers (0 through 25), each mapped to an observed operation category such as branch, call, arithmetic, store, allocation, or exception.
- A small reference table of common numeric status codes an engine's output tends to use: a success code, a block/reject code, two distinct retry-needed codes for different retry reasons, and a generic-failure code.
Who it's for
Security researchers doing authorized reverse engineering of a web asset's obfuscated, VM-based JavaScript components, who are expected to record what they found in the project's field-journal afterward and update routing.md when a new tool or target pattern turns up.
FAQ
Common questions
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